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AIRLIE  HOUSE  SEMINAR  - September  8-10,  1978 
MR.  SCHULMANN:  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 
I  am  delig_hted,'to  have  this opportunity to talk to  you 
.,£  .•  ·• 
about  ~he current world  economic  and  monetary situation 
}n general  and  about  the plans  to create  a  zone  of 
monetary  stability in Europe  in particular.  You  are 
all only too well  aware  of  the  interrelated problems 
besetting the world  economy -- unemployment,  inflation, 
exchange  rate instability,  growing  protectionism 
and.therefore  no  doubt  more  interested in policy 
.~ 
prescriptions than  in  yet another essay in economic 
analysis.  I  shall try to bear these preferences  in mind 
~·~· 
in what  I  am  going to say.  And  since  we  who  have  gathered 
-
here are particularly interested in those  problems  which 
bear on  the  relatio~ship between  the  United States and  the 
European  Community,  I  inted to  spend  the bulk of  my 
time  on  how  the European.Monetary  System whose  outline 
was  agreed. upon at Bremen  but the details of which  are 
still on  the drawing  board might affect our currencies 
and our economies. 
There  are  few -- if any -- analysts  who  are  content with 
the state of affairs  in the  Summer  of  · '78.  It is three 
years  since we  have  passed  through  the  trough of  the 
current world business  cycle but our economies  are still 
not behaving in the way  they used  to  in previous cyclical 
upswings.  In most of them the recovery has  been  slow and 
zig-zagging;  the rate of inflation,  though  on  a  downward 
trend in most  countries,  is still high by  the  standards of 
the  SO's  and  60's  and unfortunately it seems  to be  on  an 
upward  trend in the United States:  payments  imbalances  have 
remained  large:  employment-- outside the United States.--
is either bel~w prerecession levels or barely holding its 
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own.  This  is the background against which  exchange  rate 
movements  of  a  magnitude  are taking place which  nobody 
would  have  been  able  to  conceive of  a  decade  ago.  There 
is probably agreement that exchange  rates have  to 
reflect differentials in inflation rates between countries, 
changes  in terms  of  trade  and persistent payments  imbalances; 
very  few  of us  would  recommend  to go  back to Bretton Woods'  fixed 
exchange rates.  Nevertheless  the disillusionment with flexible 
exchange rates is growing.  Disorderly exchange  rate movements, 
i.e.  exchange rate movements  going far  beyond what would  be 
justified by  underlying economic  trends,  seem to have  become 
a  regular feature of  the  system rather than the exception. 
There  is  a  widespread feeling that we  are not only experiencing 
wide  swi~gs around  an  inevitable trend but that these  swings 
are having  an  impact  on that trend itself.  Moreover,  the 
incidence of this exchange market diesorder is distributed 
rather unevenly,  being concentrated on  some  key currencies 
rather than  spread across  the board.  Also,  disorder seems  to 
be  most  pronouced if and  when it originates in changing 
expectations  about  the u.s.  dollar which  remains  by far 
the most  important currency  in the  system as  a  whole. 
Because of  the high degree of integration European  economies 
are particularly vulnerable  in this_respect.  As  a  matter of 
fact,  intra-Community  exchange  rate~changes have  been  even 
·~~ 
greater than,  say,  th~between the  Yen  and  the dollar or the 
dollar and  the  DM. 
~· 
This  is the broad background  against which  the  European 
Council  of  Bremen  instructed the  Council  of Ministers of 
Economics  and Finance early in July to elaborate the 
necessary provisions  of  a  scheme  leading to  a  zone  of 
monetary stability in Europe -- the European Monetary 
I 
System  (EMS).  This  task is currently  pursu~d by. several 
.  :··  r·· 
Community  committees  with  a  view of  pu~tinq a  definitive 
proposal before the  European Council  in early December. 
I  assume  that most  of  you  are familiar with the  terms  of 
reference of  these  committees.  Essentially,  they relate to ·', 
the nature of  the  future  EC  exchange  rate  system  and  the 
means  to support this  system.  Since  the details of the 
scheme  are still under discussion it would  make  little 
sense to deal with  them at this  stage.  Instead  I  propose 
'  to address  the broad implications  such  a  system might  have 
on  economic  and monetary  relationships  between  the United 
States  and  the  European  Community  as  seen  from  Bonn. 
This  seems  all the  more  appropriate  since  some  concern  has 
been expressed on this side of  the Atlantic about  the effects 
the  EMS  might  have  on  the dollar.  In the  German  view this 
concern is unwarranted.  It could be  summarized  in the  follow-
ing  two  arguments: 
(1)  The  Europeans  are  launching the  EMS  to challenge  the  role 
of the  US-dollar as  an  international means  of  payment  and 
store of value.  This  would  be detrimental to the  world eco-
nomy  because  the co-existence of  several reserve currencies 
would  increase further still the instability of  exchange  rates 
between  the major currencies. 
(2)  The  Europeans  are trying to get  round obligations outlined 
in Article  IV  of  the. IMF  Articles·· of Agreement;  the  system 
would  have  a  contractionary1>  effect on  the world  economy 
because it puts stability before  growth,  and it might  cause 
erratic fluctuations  of the dollar excnange  rate. 
1)  I  have  been told by  my  British friends  that this  term does 
not exist in the English  language.  If it does  not,  there 
is nevertheless  a  need  for it. Economists  should  be  able 
to distinguish between matters  which  affect the'real' 
economy  and  th~which bear  'only'  on  money  and prices.  In 
my  mind it is highly desirable to pursue  pol~cies which 
are,  in Keynesian  parlance,  'deflationary' if they result 
in more  (real)  growth  over  the  medi~m···terrfi~- Let  'inflationary' 
and  'deflationary'  stand for measures  that increase  .or 
decrease  the  supply of  money  and  creC.it.  But  let'expans-
ionary'  and  'contractionary'  stand for measures  that affect 
the  'real'  economy  in a  positive or negative  sense.· These  arguments  are obviously in stark contrast to the 
intentions  of the initiators of  the  EMS,  which  is to create 
in Europe  a  zone  of monetary stability and  thus  lay the 
basi·s  for  adequate  and  stable growth.  In other words,  we 
want  to help restore world  economic  equilibrium by  bringing 
more  order into the  system of  intra-Community  exchange  rate 
relationships  than  we  have  had  since  1973.  It really goes 
without  saying that - in agreement  with our partners  in 
North America  and  North East Asia  - we  also want  to maintain 
orderly monetary relations  throughout the world. 
Let there be  no  mistake  about this:  We  in Europe  want  a  strong 
dollar,  a  dollar which derives its strength basically from 
the strength of  the United  States  economy.  We  want  a  strong 
dollar because  we  have  felt the  repercussions  of its weakness 
virtually almost without interruption since  the  end of  the 
sixties'.  Even after the general  transition to floating ex-
change  rates our central banks  have  had  to  buy  dollars  in 
huge  quantities  to keep erratic exchange  rate movements  within 
limits,  i.e.  movements  out of line with  longer-term market 
trends.  But  even if it was  only because of the  consequences 
for our  domestic  price stability,  this is not  a  policy which 
we  can afford to pursue  in the  long  run.  A  weak  dollar also 
tends  to disturb intra-Community  exchange  rate relationships, 
even if the overall economic situation.,._gives  no  cause  for 
this.  In our  view it is primarily through  United _States  action 
to  reduce  energy imports  and  to combat  domestic  iP;flation 
that the dollar will  regain its strength.  In other words,  the 
strength or weakness  of  the dollar is not conditional upon 
the existence or non-existence of the  EMS. 
·In any  case  concern that the European  Currency  Unit  (ECU)  might 
become  a  competitor of  the dollar,  is to  say  th~ least,  very 
premature.  Reserve  currencies are not create<l-by politicians 
.-,.,;_:  . 
at the  stroke of  a  pen~  they are  rnade,··in  the  final analysis, by  the market.  Like  the dollar,  therefore,  the  ECU  could 
only  grow  into such  a  role if European  economic  policies, 
in the  eyes  of potential investors,  proved  to  be  more 
successful  than its competitors'  over  a  period of  time;  it_ 
would  therefore be  a  very gradual  process.  We  are certainly 
not seeking  such  a  role.  In any  case it would  be  pure  guess-
work  to try and  predict what  the consequences  of  such  a 
development would be.  For  the time being it is only envisaged 
that the  ECU  would  become  the  instrument of settlement among 
EC  central banks. 
We  would  expect,  however,  that the  EMS  will have  a  stabilizing 
impact  on  the exchange  rates between  the dollar and  the 
European currencies.  For  the  exchange  rate between  two  large 
monetary  areas is less prone  to disturbance  than the  exchange 
rate between  one  large and  many  small  currency areas  (and 
compared  with the dollar area the  DM  zone  is also  small)  be-
cause  we  are dealing with larger and therefore more  inert 
masses.  Yet it will  no  doubt  be  necessary  from  time  to  time 
to counteract erratic fluctuations  by  interventions  on  both 
sides of  the Atlantic,  as  envisaged in the  joint German-
American  statements of  January and  lvlarch  this year. 
The  fear has  been  expressed in  var~6us quarters that the  EMS 
would if anything hamper  rather than accelerate growth  in the  . . ..  _  .. .....,... 
European  Community.  This  fear is based  on  the  assumption  that 
the  rules of the  EMS  - especially the  conditions for  changing 
~:  . 
the central rates  and  for  obtaining balance-of-payments  support  -
might  be tilted, i.e. have  a  'deflationary bias'.  Several  EC 
committees  are currently engaged  in the  task of elaborating 
these  rules,  and without wishing  to anticipate the  outcome 
of their discussions it can already be  said quite clearly 
that this fear is unwarranted.  First of all the initiators 
· of  the  EMS  do  not  presume  that beginning. "on  .;ranuary  1,  1979, 
_r-
exchange  rates within the  system will :be  fixed  for ever.  This is the starkest difference between  the  EMS  and what  or 
European  Monetary  Union  would  imply;  the latter would  mean 
that exchange  rate within the  EC  would  be  irrevocably fixed. 
Indeed,  in the  plans  published at Bremen,  provision has 
specifically been  made  for  changes  in central rates.  Thus 
occasional  upward  or  downward  adjustments will be able  to 
allow  for  continuing differences  in cost,  price and product-
ivity trends  between participating countries,  as  has  already 
been  the case for  a  good  number  of  years within the  snake. 
What  will be  ruled out,  however,  are short-term fluctuations 
in intra-Community exchange  rates which bear  no  relation 
to medium-term  trends  ('over-- or undershooting').  The  over-
all result of  such  an  exchange  rate policy promises  to be 
greater stability of expectations  and  steadier and  higher 
private  investment in participating countries  and  hence  more 
growth.  It is a  fact that many  small  and medium-sized  - even 
multinational  - enterprises have,  as  a  result of  the  monetary 
turbulences  in recent years,  become  rather cautious  as  regards 
their investment decisions.  This  is to the  detriment of  those 
economies  which  - unlike  the  US  economy  - are not primarily 
oriented towards  the domestic  market.  Up  until  1973  intra-EC 
trade grew more  rapidly than world  trade;  since  then  the 
opposite has  occured. 
Second,  the  communique  issued_ ~after  th.~ Bremen  European  summit 
already contains  a  reference to the effect that  ~urplus 
countries,  too,  in shaping their internal and  ext~rn~l policies 
will have  to take  into account  the interest of  the  Community 
as  a  whole if the EMS  is to  be  durable  and effective. 
Th±rd,  it is  somewhat  ironical that exactly the opposite fear 
is being expressed in the Federal Republic,  namely that the 
EMS  will have an' inflationary bias  • •  Naturally,  we  in Europe 
want  to establish neither a  system that has  an-:' inflationary 
- .  /'" 
'  .  . 
bias'  nor  a  system that has  a  'deflatio'nary bias'.  On  the contrar What  we  need is more  growth  and  (hence)  less inflation than 
over the last fiv.e  years.  We  are firmly  convinced that both 
can  be  achieved  through  the  European  Monetary  System because 
the  exchange  rate instability that has  prevailed since  the 
Bretton Woods  system broke  down  has  been  one  of  the  major 
factors,  though definitely not  the only one,  responsible  for 
the  low  growth rates  and  the  inflation 
European  economies. 
proneness  of the 
The  fear  that the  EMS  might  provoke erratic fluctuations  of 
the dollar rate is presumably based on  the.assumption that  a 
currency basket would  become  the  system's  numeraire.  As  a 
result,  the numeraire itself would  vary with each intervention. 
In the  German  view this would  lead to  a  number  of undesirable 
consequences1). 
Furthermore,  the question has  been raised whether  the establish-
ment  of  the  EMS,  even if not violating the spirit and  the 
letter of the  IMF  Articles of Agreement,  would  not tend to 
weaken  the  Fund's  role in the  international monetary  system. 
In  this context it should  be  noted first of all that the 
European  economies,  and  especialLy the  EC  economies,  are  much 
more  closely interwined than,  say,  Japan  in relation to North 
America or North America  in relation to Europe.  Hence  it is 
quite' appropriate  for· these  countries,"'to  strive for  closer 
cooperation in the  field of monetary policy as well.  The  IMF 
Articles of Agreement certainly do  not rule out such schemes. 
The  'snake  in the  tunnel'  which  followed  the  Smithsonian 
Agreement  was  considered  an  integral part of the  world monetary 
system,  and  the  same  is true of the block-floating of the 
Community  currencies  in relation to the dollar after the  break-
down  of  the Bretton Woods  system  in March  1973. 
1)  Subsequent events  have  led to  a  situation wherethere is 
a  virtual certainty that intervention obligations will be 
un:equ·ivicolly  fixed in  a  'snake-type'  parity grid. If the  EMS  promotes  growth  and  reduces  inflation in Europe 
as  intended,  this would at the  same  time help considerably 
to stabilize the world  economy,  and  thus  to achieve  the 
objectives laid down  in the  IMF  Articles of  Agreement  and 
also to strengthen that institution.  In this  connection one 
may  legitimately point out that the  EC  has  for  some  time 
now  been  speaking with  one voice  in trade matters.  It would 
be difficult to understand why  an  economic  region of  approx-
imately the  same  weight in the world  economic  system as  the 
United States should not  speak with one  voice,  or at least 
one-and-a-half voices,  in monetary matters  as  well  instead 
of  seven or nine voices. 
It has  also been  argued  that the partial pooling of the  member 
countries'  gold and  foreign  exchange  reserves  as  well  as  the 
creation of additional credit facilities within the  EMS  would 
excessively increase global liquidity.  Those  holding this 
view  suspect the  EMS  of generating inflationary impulses, 
but this contradicts  the fear that the  EMS  would  have  a 
'deflationary bias'.  To  argue  that the partial pooling of gold 
reserves  would  once  more  assign  a  more  important role to gold 
within the  international monetary  system is hardly more  con-
vincing;  already  today it is left to every  IMF  member  country 
to value and use its gold reserves  in whatever manner it seems 
appropriate.  Moreover:,  the scale of  th~EMS support mechanisms 
must  be  seen in relation to the  task they are  to perform.  It 
could be  argued that unlike  the  IMF,  the  EMS  has  ~ot _so  much 
been  assigned the role of  a  'lender of last resort'  in case 
of persistent balance-of-payments difficulties as  that of  a 
'day-to-day-guarantor'  of stable but adjustable central rates 
among  the participating countries.  To  that extent comparisons 
between  the  scale of the  support mechanisms  envisaged  for  the  .  -
EMS  and  the  volume  of quotas  in the  IMF  is less  relevant  and 
may  even  be misleading.  Furthermore,  there,is .tittle to suggest 
:  •  _r'··  ' 
that the  EMS  countries will  take  no  ac~'ount· whatsoever of  the 
pre-1973  experience  and stick to central rates which  would 
in the  long  run  be  out of  step with  the  market  forces.  By the  same  token,  the  EMS  should foster the dismantling of 
existing restrictions on capital movements. 
From all this it should not be  concluded that the  initiators 
of the  EMS  are  seeking to play down  the role of  the  IMF  in 
maintaining  a  workable world monetary  system.  The  EMS  countries 
will continue  to participate fully in the activities of the  IMF. 
From  a  practical point of view the  IMF  may,  however,  be better 
qualified to solve global rather than regional monetary pro-
blems.  The  EMS  could help relieve the·· Fund of  some  of its 
burden at a  focal  point of  international monetary  relations 
and  thus  enable it to deal  even  more  effectively with  the 
global  problems.  These  certainly include  the monetary relations 
among  the three major  industrialized regions  which  are  the 
mainstay of the world monetary  system:  North  America,  North 
East Asia  and  Europe.  The  Fund would  thereby take  account of 
the multi-polarization of  the world  economy  which  has  occured 
since its founding  fathers  met at Bretton Woods. 
In  my  view,  one  of  the  most -- if not the most -- important 
criteria by  which  the  success or failure of  the  EMS  will have 
to be  judged is the contribution it will make  towards  the 
solution of the world  economy's  ~ajor problems:  How  to restore 
growth  and  high  employment  under  conditions of internal and 
external economic  stability. 